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Models, Idols, and the Great White Whale: Toward a Christian Faith of Nonattachment 
Jeremy R. Hustwit, Methodist University 
“What am I that I should essay to hook the nose of this leviathan?” 
-Herman Melville, Moby Dick 
 
 
Abstract: The juxtaposition of models of God and Christian faith may seem repugnant to many, as models are 
tentative and faith aims at an abiding certainty. In fact, for many Christians, using models of God in 
worship amounts to idolatry. By examining Biblical and extra-Biblical views of idolatry, I argue that models are not 
idols. To the contrary, the practice of God-modeling inoculates Christians against one of the most seductive idols of 
our age: the love of certainty. Furthermore, by examining meditations upon certainty in Melville’s Moby Dick and 
the early discourses of the Buddha, I suggest that overweening conviction is a vice that hinders rather than 
guarantees Christian discipleship, and that Christian faith is better defined as any or all of the following: relative 




Can we put our faith in a model? On the surface, the question is nonsensical—a paradox. 
Models, at least when used in the sciences, are tentative constructs. We use models to stand in 
for a thing when that thing’s properties are obscured.1 Faith, on the other hand, is commonly 
thought of as supreme confidence, which is opposed to the hypothetical restraint of models. 
Scientists typically are not “born again” to the Rutherford atom, nor should economists accept 
supply side theories as their rock and redeemer. It seems downright confused to have 
unassailable confidence in a hypothesis. By the same token, many Christians will find models 
antithetical to faith. In fact, the critic of God-modeling will surely notice a resemblance to the 
Judeo-Christian tradition’s elder statesman of sin: idolatry. After all, God-modeling tends to be 
pluralistic, hypothetical, and often subversive. By examining the allegories of Melville’s Moby 
Dick and the metaphysical reticence of early Buddhism, we will see that the resemblance is only 
superficial. If there is a danger of idolatry, it lies in the love of certainty. Once we jettison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this essay, I am assuming that models are primarily used as attempts to emulate some external reality. This is not 
a universal view among theologians. There are many who insist that placing models into a correspondence relation 
with an objective thing-in-itself is to buy into a discredited subject-object dualism. For arguments for and against my 
assumption, see “Can Models of God Compete?” in this volume. 
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certainty as the goal of Christian discipleship, it appears that models of God are actually boons to 
the faithful.  
 
1. The Varieties of Idolaters 
For better or worse, models have been employed throughout the history of Christianity. We need 
only to look at the controversies embroiling the early Church to see, for example, Trinitarian 
models of God side by side with Arian Binitarian, Gnostic Ditheistic, Adoptionist, and Sabellian 
models. Despite their esoteric labels, these models defined the thoughts, prayers, and devotion of 
Christian lives. But they also were denounced as examples of the one sin that is sure to rouse the 
ire of Yahweh: idolatry. In order to decide if models of God are idolatrous, we need to determine 
what exactly constitutes idolatry and why it is so pernicious. Unsurprisingly, iconoclasts have 
not spoken with one voice on the issue, and we can tease out at least three distinct types of 
idolaters that may describe God-modelers. 
 
1.1 Whores 
The oldest accusations of idolatry involve an obligation of loyalty between two parties, and its 
betrayal. This is the view most commonly found in the Hebrew Bible. During the First Temple 
Period and subsequent exile, the notion of a binding covenant between God and Israel was 
central to Hebrew religion. Furthermore, this covenant was fulfilled by Israel’s performance of 
rituals. The blistering criticism of the prophets rarely focused on incorrect beliefs, or improper 
sentiments. Actions—usually sacrifices—were how Israel was to remain faithful, and actions 
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were how Israel could betray God. As a result, Israel’s relationship with God was described by 
Hosea, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah as an adulterous marriage:  
But you trusted in your beauty, and played the whore because of your fame, and lavished 
your whorings on any passer-by…. You also took your beautiful jewels of my gold and 
my silver that I had given you, and made for yourself male images, and with them played 
the whore… (Eze 16:15, 16:17) 
This earliest notion of idolatry applies only to actions performed before physical representations 
of foreign deities. The sexual comparison is unmistakable. The offense lies in the betrayal of 
loyalty owed to God, which is parallel in many ways to the loyalty expected in a marriage.  
 The prospect of betraying God with ritual worship only makes sense in a monolatrous 
system, in which other Gods are admitted to exist, but are prohibited. One would have to make a 
conscious decision to petition a deity other than Yahweh. So, by the fifth century BCE, when 
strict monotheism’s victory was nearly complete, the salience of the betrayal model had waned. 
Furthermore, God-modeling today tends to be an imaginative task more than anything. The 
abstractions of modern theologians are fashioned with words, not wood or stone. Even if today’s 
God-modelers did propitiate physical idols, those who think of models of God as metaphors for a 
single divine being would not necessarily be betraying God, as their worship is aimed at the one 
true God, albeit by means of diverse symbols. Contemporary God-modelers modelers may be 
many things, but they are not, by definition, whores. “Ritual betrayal,” however, are not the last 
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1.2 Fools 
In late antiquity and the early medieval period, idolatry, in concept and practice, was 
internalized. Worship was directed at ideas rather than golden statues. But perhaps this is more 
dangerous. If our ideas fail to match the reality of God, then many theologians argue we have 
made an idol out of our misconceptions. If so, should we be held accountable for their beliefs as 
well as their actions? Jewish philosopher Maimonides thinks so. He argues that any language 
about God is to be condemned because it either a) anthropomorphizes God into having a body 
and/or psyche, or b) falsely divides God into a multiplicity by means of the subject-predicate 
structure of language (Halbertal and Margalit 1998; Maimonides 1956). God, according to 
Maimonides, is so transcendent that any positive language about God, including mental 
language, must be false. A significant portion of Christians may agree with Maimonides and go 
so far as Calvin, who exclaims that human speculation about God’s nature, i.e. constructing 
models of God, is “folly, nay madness,” (Calvin 1975, 100).  
It’s important to point out two crucial features of models that undermine Calvin’s charges 
of folly and madness. First, it is almost certainly true that our models of God, despite our best 
efforts, fail spectacularly to capture God’s essence. Where the overzealous iconoclasts see the 
distance between a model and reality as an error, the truth is that this distance is what allows 
modelers to resist idolatry. The term “models” calls attention, like a blinking neon sign, to that 
gap between our metaphors and God’s reality. A model is a self-conscious admission that 
language, at least for now, fails to capture reality. Furthermore, the label of “model” is an 
agonist, which continually refreshes the tension between every metaphor’s tenor and vehicle.2 It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an in-depth theory of metaphor based on the tensive interaction between tenor and vehicle, see Paul Ricoeur, 
“Metaphor and the Semantics of Discourse,” The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 
65-100. 
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preserves against the gradual death of theological metaphors. Metaphors like “Unmoved Mover,” 
and “Poet of the Universe,” when labeled as models, are preserved as hypothetical constructs.3 
Those who self-consciously model God are reminded again and again that their constructs will 
always fall short of ultimate reality. As long as these metaphors are wedded to the category of 
“models,” they cannot collapse into dead idols. 
Second, the drive to innovate is inherent in the use of models. After all, if we thought a 
model were perfect, it would cease to be a model. So, models proliferate and invite revision. The 
inherent plurality of God-modeling draws attention to the limitations of each model. That 
irritating grain of uncertainty, which pushes speculation ever onward, also prevents the 
petrifaction of fresh ideas. It seems then, as long as models are self consciously labeled as such, 
cognitive error is hardly a danger. The distance between model and Truth is essential to the very 
concept of a model. 
 These two considerations imply that most Christians who use models in their devotions 
will not mistake those models for divine reality, and thus fall into idolatrous error. But even if 
they did, there are good reasons to believe that foolish beliefs about God are not, in fact, grave. 
Many models of God that play up God’s mystery and transcendence suggest that accurate 
knowledge of God is difficult, if not impossible, for humans. Many religious disputes cannot be 
settled by natural revelation nor by scripture. This ambiguity is multiplied by hermeneutical 
insights about the profound differences in the way individuals interpret the world. Expecting 
humans to adhere to orthodoxy is a fight against entropy—not just herding cats, but expecting 
cats to herd themselves. The unlikelihood of consensus is not necessarily a reason to abandon it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  “Holy Trinity,” for most Christians, has been robbed of its status as model, and in its demotion to orthodoxy, has 
lost the creative tension between tenor and vehicle that enriches and multiplies its meaning.	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but it does prompt some critical examination, and though there is insufficient space to argue it 
here, it seems the primary injunctions of the Gospels have little to do with correct belief. 
 
1.3 Philistines 
If our culture no longer struggles with ritual infidelity, and the specter of error has lost its teeth, 
we must look elsewhere for idolatry. Many have construed idolatry as a problem with values 
rather than propositional beliefs—a matter of misvaluation. When we confuse a means for an 
end, or mistake a limited good as the Final Good, we have made an idol of it. A church leader 
who spends millions of dollars in donations on a new bowling alley may be an idolater. The 
bowling alley has become an idol, as the minister values it more than other, higher goods. It is 
not hard to imagine thousands of variations on this theme, in which our projects capture more 
and more of our attention until they eclipse what should be our ultimate concern. Misvaluation, 
unlike definitions based on betrayal or error, seems to really capture the existential struggle faced 
by Christians in the post-industrial West.  
Does God-modeling warp the values and priorities of Christians? No, models of God will 
largely reflect the values of the modeler. But if there is an assertion of value implicit in model-
based theology, it an aversion to one of the most seductive and misvalued idols of our age: the 
love of certainty. In this respect, God-modeling actually subverts idolatry. 
 
2. The Danger of Harpoons 
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In our exploration of God-modeling, it may help to turn our attentions to the sea. Moby Dick, 
Melville’s famous allegory of an obsessed whaler chasing after a white sperm whale, is a striking 
meditation upon holding on and letting go, of hubris and humility, of attachment and equanimity. 
If there is one man who can speak to us of idols, attachment, and life out of balance, it is Ahab. 
Melville’s allegory seems clear enough. As the whaling vessels venture out into the 
chaotic waters in pursuit of Biblical leviathans, they parallel our religious impulses, perpetually 
fishing bounty up from the murky depths. The whale is God, or rather every whale is a model of 
God. The science of whales and whaling is theology. Ishamel even cites whale experts, who 
lament the difficulty of constructing a systematic cetology, as there is an “impenetrable veil 
covering our knowledge of the cetacean,” and an “unfitness to pursue our research in 
unfathomable waters,” (Melville 1993, 109). There is clearly a tension between the desirability 
of these submerged beasts, and the mystery that surrounds them. We crave them despite (because 
of?) their obscurity. 
In the quest for god-whales, less heroic men on firm ground make do with their own 
fabrications. Father Mapple, for instance, tries to convince his congregation that Jonah shows 
“true and faithful repentance,” when in fact Jonah only submits after God crushes him physically 
and emotionally—quite a dubious reading. Mapple’s sophistry is paralleled by Queequeg, who 
spends the sermon whittling away at the idol in his pocket in order to give it a more pleasing 
appearance (Melville 1993, 39, 41). As Lawrance Thompson notes, each manipulates his 
separate God until it suits him—Mapple uses rhetoric while Queequeg uses a jackknife. 
(Thompson 1952, 164). The implication is that all religion involves a degree of artifice. Jean 
Calvin, official theologian of New England whalers, agrees, observing, “man’s nature, so to 
speak, is a perpetual factory of idols,” (Calvin 1975, 108). Calvin would have us rely on 
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unsullied revelation as opposed to the madness of speculation. But Melville’s point is that even 
Biblical revelation goes through the meat grinder of our perspectives and interests—for better or 
worse. We cannot help but interpret God’s nature according to a complex array of criteria, both 
conscious and unconscious.  
 Ahab however, has no patience for the safe accommodation of human speculation. He 
strikes out beyond the pale, into the chaos, to dominate the one whale that is either principal or 
agent of the malevolent God. In the beginning of the voyage, Ahab is reclusive, but as the 
voyage progresses, both nature and other whalers feed him rumors and hints of his prey, and his 
obsession is exacerbated until in a fiery climax, he taunts a violent lightning storm, and demands 
to “be welded” with the “unsuffusing thing beyond,” (Melville 1993, 423). Of course, his 
demand is his doom, as Ahab does eventually meet with the whale, but is yanked overboard by 
the ties that bind him to the harpooned object of his obsession.  
Most literary critics locate Ahab’s tragic flaw in his desire to transcend mortal limitations 
and know the unknowable, and this is surely one layer of meaning in the tale. But perhaps the 
object of Ahab’s quest was not the problem. Perhaps it was the tenacity with which he pursued it. 
After all, not every whaler who wrestles a leviathan from the deep meets an untimely end. 
Instead, what sets Ahab apart from other whalers is his pathological desire—his obsession. Ahab 
is not doomed because of his mystical streak, seeking that which is hidden beyond common 
appearances. Ahab’s doom is his idolatrous conviction, grown monstrous. As his preoccupation 
is fed, it masters him, leads to an imbalance in character, and undermines his moral obligation to 
provide for the safety of his crew.  
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Ahab is an object lesson to the theologian: suffering awaits those who lash themselves 
too securely to one model. The obscurity of God’s reality can cause anxiety and rage, and there 
is something seductive about the idea of unsullied revelation. But our desire for truth, like any 
other desire, can burgeon into malignancy. When we get too attached to one model in particular, 
the self becomes parasitic upon the model, and we have become Ahab. Absolute certainty causes 
imbalance when our convictions work for us. When our chosen model is sunk, which may be 
inevitable, our attachment to it drags us down as well. Moby Dick shows us that if there is an idol 
to be feared, it is not the constructive artifice of Mapple and Queequeg—there is no alternative to 
that. The falsest idol is overweening conviction. 
 
3. An Unsteady Raft 
If reflection upon models of God pushes us from the love of certainty, then what alternative is 
left? Should we remain beatifically muddled, refusing to take any position? The Christian 
tradition overflows with expertise in cementing beliefs in place, but when it comes to mental 
flexibility, we often find ourselves flailing. The temptation is to assume the only alternative to 
attachment is its opposite: apathy. This, however, is a false dilemma, and our Buddhist friends 
can help us balance engagement with nonattachment to models of God.  
 Early Buddhism is unique in that it is perhaps one of the only religions that deliberately 
avoids metaphysical speculations, which are labeled “opinionated views” by the Buddha.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The distrust of speculation did not last long and Abhidharmika schools quickly arose. These schools used the early 
discourses to construct what appear to be systematic ontologies based on the Buddha’s teachings. Both Buddhist 
reformers and contemporary scholars disagree as to whether the Abhidharmika schools were producing “opinionated 
views” or not. Charles Goodman, for instance, argues that Abhidharma was the construction of a minimally 
defensible ontology of the ultimate constituents of reality, (Goodman 2004). Edward Conze, on the other hand, 
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Questions about such views—the nature of the self, cosmos, and the afterlife—were asked of the 
Buddha again and again, who refused to comment. On one occasion, a young monk by the name 
of Malunkyaputta decided to abandon the Buddha’s teachings because the Buddha would neither 
confirm nor deny opinionated views. The Buddha’s reply:  
“Just as a person—having been pierced by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and his 
friends and relatives, having procured a surgeon—might speak thus: ‘I will not have this 
arrow withdrawn until I know whether the person who wounded me is either a nobleman, 
a Brahmin, a merchant-farmer, or a worker… has a certain name and a certain clan… is 
tall or short or medium height… This person would still be ignorant of those things, and 
then that person would die.” (Cula-malunkya Sutta, 429) 
 
Here, the Buddha warns against pursuing opinionated views because they “are not useful in 
attaining the goal,” which is to escape the bondage of suffering (Cula-malunkya Sutta, 431). 
Knowing the truth about metaphysical matters is neither sufficient nor necessary for achieving 
salvation. In fact, attachment to opinionated views is listed as one of the primary causes of 
suffering, along with attachment to vows and attachment to material objects. Every conviction 
becomes “a jungle of views, a wilderness of views, a wriggling of views, a writhing of views, the 
fetter of views, bringing suffering, vexation, despair, and agony,” (Aggivacchagotta Sutta, 486). 
The more we invest in convictions, the more we resemble a convict. 
Opinionated views are believed to cause suffering for at least two reasons. First, those 
who crave final answers are looking for permanence and stability in a world that affords none. 
The Buddhist conception of the world is one of profound impermanence. Any theological 
doctrine held with finality tries to nail down and define a reality that will not hold still. The result 
is always disillusionment and sometimes worse. Even if we do not accept the teaching of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
claims that Abhidharma is not theoretical metaphysics at all, but a practical attempt to deconstruct commonsense 
intuitions, (Conze 1959). 
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impermanence, which is by no means alien to the Christian tradition, every individual’s finite 
perspective achieves the same effect. No matter how adequate a model of God we produce, it 
will eventually be found lacking.5 This is especially true given the problem of agreeing on what 
counts as an adequate model of God.  
Second, the very act of taking a stand for a view is an ego-reinforcing action. This is true 
on the level of everyday vice—being right tends to inflate us with conceit, especially when 
others are so very, very wrong. But attachment reinforces ego on a more radical level. The whole 
game of “truth versus error” is predicated upon an ontology of permanent selves who enjoy the 
future benefits of knowledge and avoid the stigma of falsehood. Though we tend to glorify the 
quest for truth and knowledge as a noble cause, it also is a highly individualistic pursuit. 
Knowledge benefits the self first and is only shared afterwards. Furthermore, the game of 
knowledge acquisition presupposes that the self is identified with knowledge, and both are 
opposed to and pitted against the objects of knowledge. These dualistic currents run deep and 
subtle, and contribute to feelings of alienation and anxiety—especially when the object of 
knowledge is also a means of salvation. These two critiques present a radical challenge to 
Christianity: if we define faith in the traditional way—as the cultivation of unassailable 
convictions about God—then faith looks to be spiritually damaging, and we must abandon it or 
redefine it. 
 At this point, some may object that we have imported entirely too many Buddhist 
teachings and that these criticisms hold no water for Christians, who among other things, accept 
the existence of an enduring self. To these objectors, we must point out that Buddhist and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Even if a verbal model were produced that corresponded perfectly with God, verification of that correspondence 
would still elude us. How would we know? The modeling process would drive us past the truth, requiring some 
future U-turn. 
Published	  in	  Models	  of	  God	  and	  Other	  Ultimate	  Realities,	  eds.	  Diller	  and	  Kasher	  (Springer	  2013)	  
Christian teachings are not entirely incommensurable on the self’s substantiality. The notion of 
kenosis, or self-emptying, has long served Christians as a description of both God’s nature, 
Christ’s significance, and an ethical ideal for humanity.6 Perhaps those who deny the existence of 
the self and those who believe it exists but should be subverted might share spiritual pointers. 
Even those Christians who anticipate the soul’s resurrection may recognize the value of ego-
diminishing practices, including nonattachment to opinionated views.  
 We should be careful, though, to distinguish between the attachment to views and the 
holding of views.7 The goal is not to flush away all judgments and sit befuddled in a haze of 
indecision. The danger lies in the attachment, not in the view. Views can be held tentatively and 
without finality. We all have the experience of using a working hypothesis. The Buddha himself 
puts forward metaphysical teachings like the impermanence of all things, the nonexistence of the 
self, and the dependent origination of all things. These teachings are offered in a spirit consistent 
with the norm of nonattachment. Another parable unpacks the way to hold views without 
clinging to them. A monk is travelling and encounters a wide and treacherous body of water. 
With no other means of getting across, the monk gathers leaves and sticks to construct a raft, 
which safely ferries him across. Now that he is on the other side, should he heft the raft onto his 
shoulder and carry it with him all of his days? No, the raft is for using, not for reassurance, or 
valuable for its own sake. (Alagadupama Sutta, 134-135). The Buddha explains that teachings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See Mark 8:34-35, Luke 14:25-33, Jn 12:24, Gal 5:24, Col 3:3-7, Rom 6-8, Rom 12:1-2, etc. Also, Thomas J. 
Oord’s The Nature of Love: A Theology (New York: Chalice Press, 2010) is a good recent example of Christian 
kenotic theology. For kenotic parallels to anatman, see Masao Abe, “God, Emptiness, and the True Self,” The 
Buddha Eye, ed. Frederick Franck (New York: Crossroad, 1982), pp. 61-74; and David Loy “A Zen Cloud? 
Comparing Zen Koan Practice with The Cloud of the Unknowing” Buddhist-Christian Studies 9 (1989), 43-60.	  
	  
7 Along the same lines, the Buddhist criticism of subject-object dualism referenced above pertains to the integration 
of knowledge and selfhood. But this need not obliterate the tensive opposition between a “subject’s” confidence in a 
model and the divine reality. If our subjects and objects are softened and made porous to each other, and beliefs are 
only loosely associated with the personality, then suffering is reduced.  
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and opinionated views have instrumental value, but one must maintain a critical distance from 
them while using them as tools. The correct disposition is one in which belief and skepticism are 
entertained simultaneously. 
 
4. From Dead Idols to Living Faith 
In sum, Ahab’s idolatrous madness and the Buddha’s equanimity suggest that traditional 
Christian faith, when understood as unassailable conviction, is spiritually unprofitable. This is so 
because clinging to belief a) ignores our own epistemic limitations, b) precludes novel 
revelations about a mysterious and inordinately complex God, c) fuels the egotism of being right 
while others are wrong, and d) reinforces the alienation between self and other. Faith-as-
conviction, in fact, becomes an idol for many people in the sense that possessing the “correct” 
beliefs about God has become more important than the moral and existential injunctions of 
Christ’s ministry. By way of constructive conclusion, I offer three rehabilitated models of faith 
that Christians may find useful.  
 
4.1 Faith, Hypothetically 
One way to recover the notion of faith is to insist that confidence and uncertainty are not 
mutually exclusive. That is, we have relative degrees of confidence in all sorts of propositions. It 
is raining right now and I am very confident it will continue to rain. My relative confidence is 
based on the accumulation of evidence: the testimony of experts, the appearance of the sky, and 
so on. Likewise, I am not very confident at all that the Punjab cricket team will win the Ranji 
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trophy. Because I know next-to-nothing about how the game of cricket is played, much less 
India’s teams, I cannot say one way or the other. Perhaps Christian doctrine ought to be 
maintained on a scale of relative confidence as well. 
Philosophers of logic and science have developed apparatuses to assign probabilities and 
make comparative judgments among empirical claims; we can develop an analogous apparatus 
for religious claims.8 Here, models of God could be evaluated with respect to explanatory power, 
predictive fruitfulness, internal coherence, aesthetic appeal, or even existential salience. Thus, 
models of God would be, as Wesley Wildman observes, placed in a “non-decisive rational 
landscape,” which allows comparative judgment, but no final decision, (Wildman 2006, 189).  
 Thorough critics may point out, however, that although this approach remedies the 
dangers of epistemic hubris and theological stagnation (the aforementioned vices a and b), it 
really just exchanges one type of belief (the certain) for another (the best explanation). That is, it 
is still possible to be attached to our best explanations, as fallible as they are. For example, I 
could still feel proud that my model of God is more coherent than my neighbor’s sorry excuse 
for a model, which she doesn’t even realize is only a model! Furthermore, replacing certainty 
with nondecisive rationalities could actually exacerbate the alienation felt by the benighted 
believer. Without a corresponding change in how one values beliefs, reigning in our epistemic 
expectations could cause anxiety or even despair at the obscurity of the divine nature.    
 
4.2 Faithfulness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For an excellent exposition of what this would look like, see Wesley J. Wildman, “Comparative Natural 
Theology,” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 27:2-3 (2006), 173-190. 
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A second model broadens faith from the category of belief to a temporal integration of inner and 
outer states. That is, faith is more properly an evolving pattern of moral decisions and behaviors 
than the compartmentalized pursuit of propositional assent. John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Lull 
argue for a version of this in their commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans. They argue that 
Paul’s use of pistis means more than just confident assent to this or that doctrine. Pistis is a 
relation between two persons that involves trust, confidence, and corresponding action. Cobb and 
Lull translate pistis as “faithfulness” to indicate the broader sense of the term (Cobb and Lull 
2005). Ahab demonstrated an abundance of faith, i.e. confidence that the whale was either an 
agent or principal of God’s malevolence. Ahab however, did not demonstrate faithfulness. He 
did not trust the whale or God, and arguably did not trust his own crew. Nor did Ahab act 
faithfully to God, whale, or crew; his maddening conviction blinded him to their needs. 
Faithfulness presupposes community, and Ahab was cut off from faithfulness by his faith.  
 Of course, the specter of egophilia can be found in the realm of action and sentiment as 
well as belief. The Buddha warns against attachment to precepts and vows as much as he warns 
of attachment to views. But perhaps the point is that genuine faithfulness is oriented toward the 
well-being and principles of the other to whom one is related. Genuine faithfulness is not a self-
aggrandized dedication to veganism or celibacy, but a dedication to something beyond the ego, 
and this selfless dedication subverts both the attachment and its effects.   
 It should be noted that this model of faith fits better with some models of God than 
others—more personal and revelatory models of God facilitate a relationship of faithfulness. It is 
difficult to begin a relationship with being itself. More mysterious, transcendent and non-
personal models of God will be less likely to inspire faithfulness. 
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4.3 Virtuous Discipline  
It may also be helpful to conceive of faith as a theological virtue. Classical virtues are defined as 
habits of character—a propensity to act in certain ways in certain situations. Furthermore, virtues 
are a “golden mean” between an extreme of excess and an extreme of deficiency. Courage, for 
example, is the mean disposition between cowardice and foolhardiness. Perhaps faith, as a virtue, 
concerns when and to what degree we make up our minds. Some of us have an excessive 
propensity to form judgments, with a mind like a bear trap—it snaps shut easily and is difficult to 
reopen. Others have difficulty forming judgments at all and refuse to take positions about 
anything. Faith, then, would be the mean between these two extremes. It is situated between 
conviction and skepticism. Inspired by the man who tells Jesus, “I believe, help my disbelief,” 
the faithful hold together belief, suspicion, wonder, and ignorance (Mk. 9:24). Conviction is 
easy. So is debilitating skepticism. It takes emotional and intellectual discipline to live life in the 
tension between a model and a mystery—an answer and a question—without backsliding into 
the easy extremes. Models of God exercise this discipline while dogma does not.  
 The above models of faith are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there is more than likely 
overlap between them. Nor does one strike me as the best hypothesis, the most faithful to God, or 
the most virtuous. For now, it must be enough to argue that models are not idols, but the craving 
of certainty is an idol. Upon examination, it seems that models of God, in their resistance to 
finality, are more likely to facilitate than to sabotage Christian discipleship.  
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